This paper discusses the e¤ects of horizontal mergers on innovation. We rely on the existing academic literature and our own research work to present the various positive and negative e¤ects of mergers on innovation. Our analysis shows that the overall impact of a merger on innovation may be either positive or negative and sheds light on the circumstances under which each of these scenarios is likely to arise. We derive a number of policy implications regarding the way innovation e¤ects should be handled by competition authorities in merger control and highlight the di¤erences with the analysis of price e¤ects.
Introduction
The debate about the impact of mergers on innovation is not a recent one. First, it is tightly related to the long-standing debate about the e¤ect of competition on innovation initiated by Schumpeter (1942) and Arrow (1962) . Second, the e¤ects of mergers on innovation have been discussed, sometimes heatedly, in a large number of cases over the last decade both in the U.S. 1 and the EU. 2 While not being new, the debate on the e¤ect of mergers on innovation has been particularly lively in Europe since the European Commission's use of a broader innovation theory of harm in the recent Dow/DuPont case. In previous merger cases, the Commission's innovation concerns were about the development and commercialization of well-de…ned pipeline products for which a substantial part of the R&D process has been completed. In contrast, in the merger between Dow and DuPont, the Commission considered the e¤ects of the merger on overall R&D investments, including those for products and technologies for which the "research" part of the R&D process will be performed after the merger takes place. Furthermore, the statement of the Commission in its press release that "only …ve players are globally active throughout the entire research & development (R&D) process"has been interpreted by some commentators as meaning that …ve-to-four mergers may be considered in the future as particularly problematic by the European Commission if they happen in industries in which R&D is a key element of competition.
The reasons behind this debate lie in the opposite e¤ects that mergers can have on …rms' incentives to invest in R&D. These e¤ects will be discussed extensively throughout the paper but let us provide here a simple example that illustrates this point. Consider two …rms that produce similar products and engage in R&D in order to develop the "next-generation" product. Assume that if only one …rm manages to do so, it becomes a monopolist, while if both of them innovate, they compete against each other. This implies that a …rm's R&D investment may have a negative impact on its rival, independently of whether the latter also invests in R&D or not. If the two …rms merge they will maximize their joint pro…ts and, consequently, they will "internalize"any negative impact of each one's R&D investment on the other's pro…t. This may tend to lower the merged entity's incentives to invest in R&D. However, this is not the only e¤ect at work. The merger also relaxes product market competition, which implies that a …rm succeeding in developing the next-generation product will be able to sell it at a higher price. This tends to increase the returns to R&D investment and, thereby, may increase the merged entity's incentives to innovate. The overall impact of the merger on innovation is a priori ambiguous because of the existence of these two opposite e¤ects. This paper relies on the existing academic literature and our own research work to present the potential e¤ects of mergers on innovation. In line with the current assessment of mergers in practice, we make a distinction between the e¤ects of mergers on the merging …rms'(and, to a lesser extent, their rivals') incentives to innovate for given innovation capabilities, and their impact on the merging partners'ability to innovate. We also distinguish between the e¤ects of mergers on R&D investments in product innovation and in process innovation because some of the e¤ects we highlight are relevant only (or particularly) for one of these two types of innovation.
Considering …rst the e¤ects of mergers on product innovation, we start with a description of what we call the innovation diversion e¤ ect. This e¤ect stems from the impact that a …rm's innovation has on its rivals'sales. A key point of our analysis is that this impact can be either positive or negative. In the latter scenario, the internalization of this "externality" a¤ects negatively the merged entity's incentives to invest in R&D, while it a¤ects them positively in the former scenario.
Next, we turn to two e¤ects of mergers on innovation that follow from the standard market power e¤ect of mergers on prices. We call the …rst one the demand expansion e¤ ect. This e¤ect is positive and captures the idea that the margin increase induced by a merger provides the merging …rms with higher incentives to innovate in order to increase their demand. The second e¤ect we identify is a margin expansion e¤ ect: in the absence of e¢ ciency gains, a merger leads to a decrease in the merging …rms'output, which lowers the …rms'incentives to innovate in order to increase their margins (by setting higher prices).
Finally, we consider the spillover e¤ ect. As has been emphasized in the literature, a given …rm's investment in R&D may not only bene…t the …rm itself but also its rivals through technological spillovers. When such a positive innovation externality exists, it creates another channel through which a merger can lead to more innovation.
We pay special attention to the recent theoretical papers by Valletti (2017a, 2017b) as they formalize the arguments that the Commission used in the Dow/DuPont case. In particular, we argue that these two papers provide only a partial picture of the impact of mergers on innovation and do not justify the authors'claim that "a merger between two out of a limited number of innovators is likely to lead to a reduction of innovation in a market characterized by limited knowledge spillovers and in the absence of other possible countervailing e¢ ciencies". In contrast, Bourreau, Lefouili and Jullien (2018) show that the overall impact of a merger may be positive even in the "worst-case" scenario in which the merger leads to monopoly and there are neither spillovers nor e¢ ciencies.
Turning to the e¤ect of mergers on process innovation, we discuss the in-depth theoretical study of this issue by Motta and Tarantino (2017) . Their analysis is grounded on the existence of a variant of our margin expansion e¤ ect: a …rm's bene…t from investing in a cost-reducing technology is lower if its output is smaller. In the absence of e¢ ciency gains in production, a horizontal merger leads to higher prices and smaller output. This creates a channel through which a merger may decrease the merging …rms' incentives to invest in process innovation.
However, they show that this need not be the only e¤ect. First, knowledge spillovers generate a countervailing e¤ect that could lead to a positive overall e¤ect on innovation. Second, when investments are observable by rivals, a new "strategic"e¤ect appears, which makes the impact of a merger generally ambiguous.
We then analyze the R&D complementarities that a merger may induce and show how they may boost innovation. We also argue that non-R&D related cost reductions induced by a merger should be taken into account not only to assess the e¤ect of a merger on prices but also to analyze its impact on innovation.
We derive the implications of our analysis on the way innovation e¤ects should be handled in merger cases. We argue that a presumption of a negative impact of mergers on innovation in R&D-intensive industries is not supported by our knowledge of how a merger impacts innovation. We contend instead that competition authorities should perform a thorough balancing exercise of the opposite e¤ects altering …rms'incentives to innovate. We also claim that all the e¤ects of a merger on the incentives to innovate should be part of the main competitive assessment carried out by competition authorities. In particular, it should include the analysis of spillover e¤ects.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents preliminary discussions that are useful for our analysis and conclusions. Section 3 examines the impact of a merger on …rms' incentives to innovate, holding …xed their ability to innovate. Section 4 analyzes the e¤ect of complementarities between R&D assets and non-R&D-related cost reductions induced by a merger on innovation. Section 5 concludes and derives the policy implications of our analysis on the assessment of innovation e¤ects in merger control.
Competition, mergers and innovation: preliminaries
This section presents preliminary discussions of issues that are relevant to our core analysis in Sections 3 and 4 and the conclusions we draw in Section 5. We …rst brie ‡y summarize a few key contributions to the literature on the relationship between competition and innovation, and discuss the relevance of this literature for the debate on the impact of mergers on innovation. Second, we point out some fundamental di¤erences between the unilateral price e¤ects of a merger and its unilateral innovation e¤ects. Third, we illustrate the lack of consensus among economists about a presumed (negative or positive) sign of the impact of mergers on innovation.
The literature on market structure, competition and innovation
The two seminal positions on the relationship between innovation, market power and competition can be summarized as follows. The Schumpeterian view contends that market power and size can promote innovation. In particular, Schumpeter (1942) considered that the short-run bene…ts from competitive pricing can be outweighed by the long-run bene…ts of market power on …rms'incentives to innovate. In contrast, Arrow (1962) showed that market power is detrimental to innovation in certain circumstances. More precisely, he argued that a monopolist has less incentives to invest in R&D than a …rm in a perfectly competitive industry. Key to his …nding is the so-called "replacement e¤ect" (Tirole, 1988) : contrary to a …rm facing strong competition, a monopolist is making substantial pro…ts even if it does not innovate.
Therefore, the di¤erence between post-innovation pro…ts and pre-innovation pro…ts -which drives the incentives to invest in R&D -is higher under competition than under monopoly.
A crucial assumption for Arrow's conclusion to hold is that the monopolist is not facing any threat of entry. If this condition is not satis…ed then the current monopolist may lose profits if it does not innovate while a potential entrant does. In this case, the monopolist may have stronger incentives to invest in R&D than a potential entrant: through innovation, the monopolist may preempt investment by a potential entrant and maintain its monopoly rent (Gilbert and Newberry, 1982) . Tirole (1988) calls this the "e¢ ciency e¤ect"as it relies on the fact that entry by a competitor usually lowers industry pro…ts, which makes the monopolist's gain from deterring entry greater than the potential entrant's gain from entering the market.
A number of authors have tried to reconcile or combine the contrasting conclusions reached by Schumpeter and Arrow. A particularly in ‡uential work in this area is the paper by Aghion et al. (2005) . These authors develop a duopoly model where, at each point in time, the industry can be either in a "neck-and-neck" state or in a "leader-laggard" state. In the former state, both …rms have the same marginal costs, while in the latter, one of them (the leader) is more e¢ cient than the other (the laggard). Focusing on cost-reducing innovation, Aghion et al. (2005) show that in the "neck-and-neck" scenario …rms have stronger incentives to innovate if competition is more intense. This is what they call the "escape the competition e¤ect", which Shapiro (2012) considers as the " ‡ip slide of the Arrow replacement e¤ect".
By contrast, an increase in competition gives a laggard …rm less incentives to innovate. 3 This is a Schumpeterian e¤ect. By combining these two e¤ects, Aghion et al. (2005) obtain an inverted U-shaped relationship between competition and innovation. 4 In a similar vein, Shapiro (2012) argues that there is no fundamental con ‡ict between the insights o¤ered by Schumpeter and Arrow. He interprets the former's thesis as saying that stronger postinnovation competition lowers …rms'incentives to innovate, while the latter's view contends that stronger pre-innovation competition leads to higher incentives to innovate. 5 Finally, Gilbert and Greene (2015) emphasize that a …rm's ability to appropriate the bene…ts of its investment in R&D is key to understand the di¤erence between Arrow's and Schumpeter's conclusions. They argue that "weak appropriation supports the Schumpeterian view that size, and, indirectly, market share promotes innovation. In contrast, if …rms can appropriate the bene…ts from their innovations, Arrow's conclusion applies, as pro…ts from existing operations reduce the net returns to innovation and the incentive to invest in R&D."
Several authors have pointed out that the literature on competition and innovation building on Schumpeter's and Arrow's seminal contributions is not directly applicable to merger analysis (see e.g., Shapiro, 2012; Motta and Tarantino, 2017; Valletti, 2017a, 2017b) . The main reason for this is that a merger not only leads to a decrease in the number of …rms (which has been used as a measure of competition intensity in a number of papers 6 ) but also allows the merging …rms to coordinate their decisions, in particular at the R&D stage. In other words, the merging …rms can internalize the externalities they were exerting on each other before the merger. However, the fact that policy prescriptions regarding the treatment of innovation e¤ects in merger control should not rely solely on the (ambiguous) results put forward by the literature on competition and innovation does not mean that this literature is not useful at all for merger analysis. On the contrary, as will become apparent in our analysis, the key e¤ects identi…ed in that literature are still relevant when assessing the e¤ects of a merger on innovation. For instance, the replacement e¤ect put forward by Arrow is very similar in nature to the "innovation externality" e¤ect driving (partly) the results in Valletti (2017a, 2017b) .
Unilateral price e¤ects vs. unilateral innovation e¤ects
Some recent studies have suggested that the analysis of unilateral innovation e¤ects in merger cases bears resemblance with the analysis of unilateral price e¤ects (see e.g., Federico, 2017; Valletti, 2017a, 2017b) . In contrast, we claim that there are three key di¤erences between competition in prices and competition in innovation that advocate for a clear distinction between the assessment of innovation e¤ects and that of price e¤ects.
First, while the substitutability between competing products is su¢ cient to justify a presumption that the merged entity will raise prices absent e¢ ciency gains, the existence of a potential negative innovation externality is not su¢ cient to make the claim that the merged 5 More precisely, Shapiro (2012) interprets the Schumpeterian thesis as saying that "the prospect of obtaining market power is a necessary reward to innovation" and Arrow's view as meaning that "a …rm with a vested interest in the status quo has a smaller incentive than a new entrant to develop or introduce new technology that disrupts the status quo".
6 See e.g., Vives (2008 Second, a fundamental di¤erence between competition in R&D and competition in prices is the potential existence of spillover e¤ects in R&D (Salinger, 2016) . Those e¤ects capture the idea that the output of a …rm's investment in R&D may bene…t its rivals, through e.g., the information disclosed in its patents. 8 When this positive externality exists, it may compensate partly, or even outweigh other negative externalities, thus altering substantially the very nature of the strategic interaction between …rms.
Finally, while a static analysis of prices, such as the one performed in a unilateral price e¤ects exercise, is meaningful, a static analysis of innovation is necessarily reductionist because of the fundamentally dynamic nature of the innovation process (see e.g., Marshall and Parra, 2018 ). This process is cumulative both at the …rm level and the industry level (Scotchmer, 2004) , which implies that a structural change, such as a merger, may have a long-lasting e¤ect on innovation.
Petit (2018) also questions the transposition of the (standard) unilateral price e¤ects exercise to innovation e¤ects. He notes in particular that R&D cannot be adjusted as quickly as prices, which might undermine merging …rms' ability to discontinue R&D (even when they have incentives to do so). He also argues that coordination in innovation can dominate competition in innovation from a welfare perspective and highlights the fact that standard unilateral e¤ects analysis ignores the organisation of R&D within the merged entity.
The lack of consensus regarding a presumed e¤ect of mergers on innovation
There is no consensus among economists about a presumed (negative or positive) sign of a horizontal merger's impact on innovation. The literature shows that the impact of a merger is generally a combination of positive and negative e¤ects (see, e.g., Katz and Shelanski, 2007; Shapiro, 2012; Gilbert and Greene, 2015) . Leading economists do not agree about how to balance these e¤ects in merger analysis, and whether there should be a presumption that mergers harm innovation absent e¢ ciency gains. The comparison of the views expressed by Katz and Shelanski (2007) and Shapiro (2012) illustrates this point. Katz and Shelanski (2007) 7 This e¤ect will be discussed in detail later. 8 Note that patent protection does not preclude spillovers as rivals can work around patents to develop non-infringing alternatives, or build on the knowledge di¤used by patents to invent next-generation products/technologies. recommend that "merger review proceed on a more fact-intensive, case-by-case basis where innovation is at stake, with a presumption that a merger's e¤ects on innovation are neutral except in the case of merger to monopoly, where there would be a rebuttable presumption of harm", while Shapiro (2012) argues that "we do know enough to warrant a presumption that a merger between the only two …rms pursuing a speci…c line of research to serve a particular need is likely to diminish innovation rivalry, absent a showing that the merger will increase appropriability or generate R&D synergies that will enhance the incentive or ability of the merged …rm to innovate."
The literature, however, does provide guidance regarding the potential e¤ects of a merger on innovation, which we discuss in detail in the next section.
3 The e¤ects of horizontal mergers on the incentives to innovate
Key concepts
Prior to analyzing the e¤ects of mergers on innovation, it is worth discussing the nature of the exercise conducted by competition authorities in merger control and how our analysis relates to it. As has been emphasized by many authors, 9 a merger can be viewed as a combination of several economic operations that a¤ect market outcomes.
Incentives vs. ability
The …rst consequence of a merger is that, holding the organization and technologies …xed, common ownership of two economic entities leads to the coordination of all these entities' actions, with the aim of achieving a common goal, namely the maximization of joint pro…ts.
Coordination implies that any action of one entity is taken by considering the implications for this entity but also considering the e¤ect on the other merging entity. Thus, each entity, when determining its pricing, production or innovation strategy, internalizes the e¤ects on its merging partner. In economic terms, a merger changes the incentives of each merging …rm. In "standard" merger analysis (i.e., when innovation e¤ects are not incorporated), the assessment of the consequences of a change in incentives brought about by a merger is done by analyzing the unilateral price e¤ects of the merger. Consider for instance a merger between two car producers. The …rst step of the analysis is to evaluate how prices will change, holding …xed the product lines and the organization of production. The presumption regarding the unilateral e¤ects of a merger on prices is that the changes in …rms' incentives will result in higher prices for each product sold when …rms compete in prices. 9 See the discussion in Shapiro (2012) for instance.
However, a merger entails more than just a coordination of the merging …rms'actions. It also a¤ects the merged entity's ability to produce. The new …rm controlling all the merging …rms'assets can re-optimize the organization of production. The reallocation of assets and/or reorganization of production allows the merged entity to reduce marginal costs of production compared to the pre-merger situation. In the example of car producers, the merging …rms can rationalize production, say by producing all engines in the same factory, or can re-optimize the product lines of each brand. The assessment of the e¤ect of a merger on the merged entity's ability to produce is di¢ cult because of its prospective nature. In particular, the quanti…cation of the e¤ects on …nal prices makes an e¢ ciency defense very complicated.
Although somewhat arti…cial, 10 the distinction between incentives and ability has proved useful and provides an operational framework for merger analysis that is consistent with the legal standards for merger control.
When innovation is to be factored, the analysis becomes signi…cantly more complex because innovation a¤ects by nature products and production processes. Since innovation alters technologies, it is no longer possible to analyze the e¤ect of new incentives resulting from the merger holding …xed production technologies and product lines. However, and precisely because of the complexity of these e¤ects, the assessment of a merger gains in clarity when the same methodological approach -focusing …rst on incentives and then considering any merger-induced increase in ability -is adopted. The analysis of incentives should determine the outcome of the coordination of the merging …rms'behaviors, now holding …xed the organization and technology in terms of R&D and production. In this context, the e¤ect of the merger on ability relates to the reallocation of resources within the merged entity and the exploitation of complementarities at two levels: R&D and production.
Where innovation is at stake, the analysis of incentives is complicated by the need to account for …rms'pricing behavior when analyzing innovation e¤ects. It is therefore necessary to understand how a merger a¤ects incentives along two dimensions -prices and investments in R&D -that are related. Moreover, as already pointed out, the analysis of innovation is by nature dynamic while in most cases an analysis of unilateral e¤ects involving only price coordination (within the merged entity) can be conducted in a static framework.
We will focus to a large extent on the e¤ect of mergers on …rms' incentives to innovate but we will also discuss their e¤ect on the merging …rms'ability to innovate. 1 0 For instance, along the lines that we will develop for the analysis of innovation e¤ects, a question arises in our car manufacturer example as to whether coordinated optimization of product lines by each brand should be treated as part of the analysis of the merging …rms'incentives to innovate or as part of the analysis of their ability to do so.
Initial impetus vs. equilibrium analysis
A second distinction that has proved useful for understanding the e¤ect of mergers is between initial impetus 11 and equilibrium behavior. A source of complexity in the analysis of unilateral e¤ects is that a merger also a¤ects the behavior of non-merging …rms, who will change prices, quantities and, in the context of innovation, their investment in R&D. The initial impetus refers to the e¤ect of the merger under the assumption that the behavior of non-merging …rms is not a¤ected by the merger. In the case of product market competition, the initial impetus leads the merging …rms to charge higher prices and sell less than what they would have done if they had set their prices independently (in the absence of e¢ ciency gains). The importance of the initial impetus stems from the idea that, while the equilibrium e¤ects resulting from rivals' responses to a merger may exacerbate the initial impetus or mitigate it, they are unlikely to reverse it (see e.g., Whinston, 2012) . Therefore, the initial impetus informs about the likely sign of the e¤ect of a merger. Moreover, a measure of the initial impetus provides useful insights into the likely magnitude of the e¤ect of a merger. A small initial impetus should lead to little reaction to the merger by non-merging …rms and hence to a small overall e¤ect. This is for instance the logic behind the "upward pricing pressure" (UPP) analysis (Farrell and Shapiro, 2010) .
Most of the debate regarding the e¤ect of mergers on innovation is about the initial impetus: will the merged entity innovate more or less than would the merging …rms in the absence of a merger? As far as innovation is concerned, there are two ways of thinking about the initial impetus. One can analyze innovation incentives …xing the R&D investments of rivals but allowing all prices to adjust post-merger, as in Federico, Langus and Valletti (2017b) . Alternatively, one could analyze innovation incentives holding constant both the prices and R&D investments of all rivals.
Product innovation 3.2.1 The innovation diversion e¤ect
Imagine a situation involving an incumbent …rm that is the sole seller of a product and a new innovative …rm that is investing to develop a rival product. If the latter succeeds, it will enter the market and "divert" some of the incumbent's sales: some consumers will prefer to buy the new product instead of the incumbent's. Consider now the innovative …rm's decision to invest in R&D. This decision depends on R&D costs, the likelihood of success, and the pro…t the innovator obtains if its investment is successful. However, the innovator will not factor in its decision the loss of sales su¤ered by the incumbent in case of success. Suppose now that the incumbent acquires the innovator before R&D takes place. Endowed with the 1 1 We use the same terminology as Farrell and Shapiro (2010) and Federico, Langus and Valletti (2017b) . innovating …rm's R&D technology, the incumbent will account not only for the sales of the new product but also for the lost sales on the old product when evaluating the gain from a successful investment. Hence, the incumbent would invest less when owning the innovating …rm than an independent innovator. This e¤ect has been well understood at least since Arrow (1962) as it underlies Arrow's view that established incumbents have less incentives to innovate than new entrants. In the economic literature, the fact that a …rm does not internalize in its strategy the negative impact on its rivals'sales is often referred to as the "business-stealing e¤ect". In particular, this e¤ect has been discussed at length in the literature on entry in a market (see e.g., Mankiw and Whinston, 1986) .
Note that the direct diversion of sales due to an innovation is ampli…ed by …rms'reactions in terms of pricing. As …rms losing demand react by reducing their prices, price competition between an innovator and its rivals may magnify the diversion of sales. For instance, an innovator that invents a superior product can either divert all or part of its rivals' sales depending on its choice of price.
We will refer to the impact of a merging …rm's innovation on another merging …rm's sales as the sales externality. Further, we will call the innovation diversion e¤ ect the e¤ect of a merger on the merging …rms'incentives to innovate stemming from the internalization of the sales externality by the merged entity. A recent and prominent illustration of this e¤ect in merger analysis is provided by Federico, Langus and Valletti (2017a) .
In this paper, the authors consider N (identical) research labs that compete to invent a product to serve a new market. One may think for instance of pharmaceutical labs trying to develop a treatment for a disease. As research is an uncertain activity, the number of labs that succeed in …nding a treatment is random. When several products are discovered, they are marketed and competition erodes pro…ts. In the above terms, …rms' innovations divert each other's sales. To simplify, Federico, Langus and Valletti (2017a) assume that competition between three or more products erodes all pro…ts. Therefore, an investor can expect positive pro…ts only if it is the sole successful inventor or there is only one other successful inventor.
They then consider what happens if two research labs merge. They assume that in this scenario the two research units remain separate but the research e¤orts exerted in each of them are coordinated by the merged entity.
Focusing on the case where the merged entity continues to invest (the same amount) in R&D in both research units, they conclude that a merged entity controlling two research labs would invest less in R&D than two independent labs. The main idea behind their argument is that, when deciding its investment in one research lab, the merged entity discounts the fact that a success would divert ("cannibalize", in their terms) sales from the product discovered by the other research lab if both succeed simultaneously. The merged entity would then invest less because it internalizes the sales externality. They also argue that for concentrated industries, the reaction of non-merging …rms will not be su¢ cient to o¤set the reduction of innovation by the merging …rms.
While a nice illustration of the innovation diversion e¤ect in a simple model of mergers, Federico, Langus and Valletti's paper should be viewed as providing one factor that should be considered, along with other factors, when evaluating innovation e¤ects in merger assessment. For reasons that we now develop, concluding that mergers are always likely to impede incentives to innovate (in the absence of e¢ ciency gains) because of the innovation diversion e¤ect would be misleading.
Merging …rms may reduce the number of research projects but invest more in the remaining ones. A crucial assumption in the model by Federico, Langus and Valletti (2017) is that the merged entity will choose to maintain both research units active. As shown by Polo (2018a, 2018b) , this assumption holds only under certain conditions. Denicolò and Polo establish that the merged entity may …nd it optimal to shut down one research lab and focus on the other one. In this case, reduced rivalry at the research level (due to the removal of one competitor) would induce …rms to invest individually more than without the merger. Through this e¤ect the merger may boost total investment and bene…t consumers.
More precisely, the logic behind their …nding is the following. A merged entity investing in two research paths internalizes potential cannibalization of sales in case of innovation duplication, that is, if both research investigations succeed in bringing new (substitutable) products to the market. This provides the merged entity with incentives to reduce its e¤ort in one research path. But this reduction raises the value of investing in the other research path as it is more likely now that it will lead to a single innovation. A consequence is that the merged entity may be tempted to reduce drastically its e¤ort in one research path and increase substantially its e¤ort in the other one. Whether it will do so or will instead reduce uniformly its e¤orts on both research paths depends on the extent of decreasing returns in R&D. In particular, when the R&D technology involves little decreasing returns at the research unit level, the merged entity will focus all its e¤ort on one research path. The resulting likelihood that an innovation will occur may be larger than in the no-merger scenario where both research paths are followed but with little e¤ort (due to the risk of duplication).
The innovation diversion e¤ect may be either positive or negative depending on the sign of the sales externality. An important feature of the setup considered by Federico, Langus and Valletti (2017a) is that innovation by one …rm always diverts sales from its rivals. 12 However, this need not always be the case. Unlike a price reduction in a price competition game, an increase in R&D activity by one …rm does not always hurt its competitors. The reason is that there are several ways through which R&D allows a …rm to 1 2 The same applies for Federico, Langus and Valletti (2017b) . make additional pro…ts. In order to escape intense competition, a …rm may invest in R&D to o¤er a product that is better than its rivals', but it can also invest to propose a product that is di¤erent from its competitors'. Most rivalry in innovation combines both dimensions.
For instance, smartphone producers clearly invest to improve the quality of their products, but they do so in part by introducing features that make these products di¤erent from those o¤ered by their rivals. While innovation leading to vertical di¤erentiation (i.e., resulting in a product of higher quality) would induce a diversion of rivals' sales, innovation leading to horizontal di¤erentiation (i.e., allowing the innovator to appeal to di¤erent customers than its competitors') may be bene…cial to rivals. This is illustrated in Bourreau, Lefouili and Jullien (2018) in a simple variant of the Hotelling duopoly model. In that setting, R&D allows to modify product characteristics so that the new product becomes relatively more attractive for consumers who are less interested in the competitor's product. A consequence is that R&D investment by one …rm relaxes price competition and allows its competitor to sell more (potentially at higher prices). As a …rm's innovation raises rival's demand, the innovation diversion e¤ect is positive: it leads to an increase in the merging …rms'incentives to invest in R&D aimed at increasing horizontal di¤erentiation (as compared to the case where they would have remained independent).
The di¤erentiation e¤ect described above is related to the analysis underlying the statement in the U.S. Horizontal Merger Guidelines that "a merger is not likely to lead to unilateral elevation of prices of di¤erentiated products if, in response to such an e¤ect, rival sellers likely would replace any localized competition lost through the merger by repositioning their product lines". The fact that …rms may innovate to "reposition" themselves away from competitors is well-documented in the literature and emphasized for instance by Gandhi et al. (2008) . These authors adapt a standard model from the empirical literature (commonly used in merger analysis) to allow …rms to choose product positioning as well as prices. Focusing on price competition, they conclude that, along the lines of the U.S. Horizontal Merger Guidelines, "combining close substitute products creates a strong incentive for the merged …rm to separate those products", and that "this repositioning substantially mitigates the merged …rm's price increases and thereby also reduces the extent to which the merged …rm's price increases" (see, also, the EU Horizontal Merger Guidelines, paragraphs 28-30 to like e¤ect). In the context of incentives to innovate, the same logic suggests that a merged …rm will reposition innovations toward more di¤erentiation, which mitigates sales diversion.
Of course, most innovation processes involve both vertical and horizontal di¤erentiation.
Firms bene…t from introducing the best and most di¤erentiated products, as they will generate the highest margins. Thus, we expect both dimensions to be present in most mergers. One illustration, though not in the context of mergers, is the analysis of product and process innovation by Lin and Saggi (2002) . In their paper, product innovation by one …rm raises its demand but also its rival's demand, due to lower substitutability between products after innovation than before. 13 Let us …nally notice that introducing a "horizontal"dimension in the innovation strategy is a way for independent …rms to guard themselves against the risk of having their sales diverted by another innovation. If two innovations occur simultaneously, product di¤erentiation allows …rms to relax competition and reduces the negative externality that each innovator exerts on the other one. Relaxing ex post competition is more important when it is likely that several innovations coexist, which is precisely when the innovation diversion matters more for …rms.
Thus, when the innovation diversion e¤ect is relevant, we expect …rms to try to di¤erentiate their innovations.
The innovation diversion e¤ect may be either positive or negative depending on whether the sales externality is greater or smaller after the merger. There is a complex and subtle relationship between price competition and sales diversion. Indeed, when products are substitutes, …rms will compete in prices and, therefore, the total value of sales diverted by an innovation will depend on the nature of competition. An important aspect of this issue can be illustrated as follows. Consider two …rms competing on the market by selling goods that are substitutes and suppose that a single …rm innovates and improves the quality of its product, making it more attractive to more consumers. There are several ways through which the …rm can monetize its innovation. For instance, the …rm could maintain its price despite the better quality of its product, which would induce a strong diversion of sales of the non-innovating …rm. Alternatively, the innovator could raise its price at a level such that its volume of sales remains the same as before the innovation. In this case, the innovator does not attract new buyers, implying that the sales of the non-innovating competitor remain unchanged (as consumers who do not buy from the innovator have no reason to change their behavior). This shows that the volume of diverted sales depends on how …rms choose to adjust prices. Moreover, when facing sales diversion, the non-innovating competitor will react by changing its prices. The resulting price competition will a¤ect both the returns from innovation and the value of diverted sales.
In this context, the merged entity will adapt its whole strategy to internalize the sales externality. In particular, it will coordinate post-innovation prices accounting for the price externality (Greenstein and Ramey, 1998; Chen and Schwartz, 2013) and may also reposition its products and research lines. In other words, the merged …rm will shape its strategy in order to raise appropriability and reduce cannibalization between the two merging …rms. The implications of this for the merged …rm's investment in R&D is in general complex.
In the Appendix, we present a simple extension of the model developed by Federico, Langus and Valletti (2017a) where innovators' products are di¤erentiated, and show that in this context, a merger may raise the level of investment in R&D (see Conclusion 3) and may bene…t consumers. We maintain the assumption that non-integrated …rms obtain positive duopoly pro…ts if they both innovate. However, a di¤erence with Federico, Langus and Valletti (2017a) is that we do not assume that the merged entity's pro…t is the same with one innovation and with two innovations. Instead, when both research labs innovate, the merged entity obtains two di¤erentiated products and brings both products to the market, adjusting prices to mitigate cannibalization between them. Therefore, it obtains a higher pro…t with two innovations than with a single innovation. We show that in this context, a merger fosters innovation if the incremental pro…t that a second innovation generates for the merged entity is larger than the duopoly pro…t that each non-integrated innovator obtains when both …rms innovate. We present a simple and standard setup (the Hotelling model with quadratic transportation costs)
where the merged entity eliminates cannibalization by raising prices. As a result, the merger entity invests more in R&D than independent …rms.
In a second paper, Federico, Langus and Valletti (2017b) consider a richer model in order to allow explicitly for the interaction between the internalization of the sales externality and price competition. They consider a symmetric oligopoly where …rms invest in improving the quality of their products and assume that an innovation replaces the old product with a new, better product. Thus, innovation in their model is purely vertical. They then study the e¤ect of a merger between two …rms on the incentives to innovate, assuming away any spillovers or e¢ ciencies. For this purpose, they decompose the impact of a merger into two terms: one term summing up the consequences of unilateral e¤ects in prices on innovation, and another one measuring the innovation diversion e¤ect. The authors do not solve analytically the model but, instead, discuss the e¤ects at work and perform numerical simulations. They obtain two results:
Their simulations …nd that there are con ‡icting e¤ects in the models they consider: the e¤ect of the merger on the pre-and post-innovation price equilibrium raises the incentives to innovate, while the innovation diversion e¤ect reduces these incentives.
In the simulations they perform, the latter e¤ect dominates so that overall impact of a merger on the merging …rms' innovation e¤orts is negative, and so is the e¤ect of the merger on consumers.
It is di¢ cult to draw lessons from this paper as the simulation exercise remains limited in terms of demand formulation and parameters. Given the existence of con ‡icting e¤ects, whether other model speci…cations may reverse the second conclusion is an open question.
The authors emphasize the fact that the parametric models they use are standard models.
However, one should keep in mind that "standard" models have special features that make them tractable at the cost of structural restrictions that may shape the relative weight of con ‡icting e¤ects. This is illustrated by the model provided in the Appendix and discussed above. Moreover, the most common and simpler model speci…cations tend to capture only some types of innovation. For instance, a common modeling approach in the literature is to require all consumers to attach the same value to an increase in product quality. Another standard model assumes that consumers care only about the product of the quantity they buy and the quality of the good. Consequently, a conclusion grounded on these models may not apply in alternative settings.
For new products, the impact of a merger on innovation is small if the sales externality is large and merged …rms maintain all research projects. A key, yet under-discussed, result in Federico, Langus and Valletti (2017a) is that when the sales externality is maximal (i.e., when competition erodes all pro…ts if two labs succeed in developing a new product), a merger has no impact on innovation. 14 We illustrate this result in the Appendix where we show in a simple two-…rm setting that the merged entity has the same incentives to innovate as two independent …rms when the sales externality is maximal (see Conclusion 2). The reason is that the value of a second innovation is zero in both cases. In the absence of a merger, a second innovator obtains no pro…t because product market competition dissipates both innovators'pro…ts. In case a merger occurs, the second innovation does not bring any additional value to the merged entity since the …rst innovation exhausts monopoly pro…t. When the merged entity chooses to invest in both projects, it cares only about the success of one of the projects. Moreover, the gain in case of a single success is the same for the merged entity and an independent …rm; it is equal to the monopoly pro…t. Because of this, it turns out that the merged entity invests the same amount than two independent …rms. 15 This is not to say that there is no e¤ect in general as full diversion (which occurs under price competition if all labs develop the same homogeneous product) is an extreme case. Moreover, the conclusion that the merger has no impact on innovation when the sales externality is maximal holds only in a setting where an innovator comes up with a new product that does not a¤ect the sales of its own old products if any. 16 That said, this conclusion implies that, when it comes to the invention of new products, the impact of a merger on innovation may be small when the sales externality is large. 17 This is the case for instance for winner-takes-all competition (Sah and Stiglitz, 1987) , which sometimes occurs for goods with network e¤ects.
Further, it is obvious that when the sales externality is small, the associated e¤ect is also 1 4 The same point has been made in a more general setting by Sah and Stiglitz (1987) . 1 5 As a consequence, the merger does not a¤ect the non-merging …rms'investment in R&D either. 1 6 Otherwise, the standard Arrow e¤ect combined with the market power e¤ect of a merger would imply that a merger reduces innovation.
1 7 In Federico, Langus and Valletti (2017a), the negative e¤ect of a merger on consumer surplus is mostly due to the standard price coordination induced by the merger rather than to innovation e¤ects. small. Therefore, it is only for intermediate levels of sales externality that the innovation diversion e¤ect plays a signi…cant role.
Demand expansion e¤ect and margin expansion e¤ect
There has been a debate over recent years about the potential e¤ect of mergers on the adoption of new technologies by telecommunication operators. Contrasting views have been expressed.
One view is that a merger, by reducing rivalry, would reduce incentives to gain a competitive advantage through the deployment of …ber landscape networks, or 4G antennas in the case of mobile telephony. The other view is that, due to higher margins and e¢ ciency gains, a merger would enhance investment in the deployment of the most advanced technology. Bourreau and Jullien (2017) contribute to this debate by considering the e¤ect of a merger on the incentives of …rms to invest in "coverage"for a new technology, where coverage determines which part of the population can access the service o¤ered by a …rm. In their two-…rm setup, di¤erent levels of coverage are chosen by the …rms. The one with the larger coverage serves both a "contestable" demand served by the other …rm as well as a "captive" demand for which it is a monopolist. Prices are the same for the contestable demand and the captive demand, and re ‡ect the di¤erences in coverage: the …rm with the larger coverage chooses a higher price than its competitor (because some of its demand is captive). Bourreau and Jullien (2017) then compare the outcome under competition with the outcome when the two …rms merge, and conclude that the merged entity will expand total coverage and reduce the contestable demand. The e¤ect of market expansion can be so strong that under some parameter values it can outweigh the e¤ect of the merger on prices, leading to a positive e¤ect of the merger on total welfare and consumer surplus.
The intuition behind this result is as follows. If, in the duopoly situation, the contestable demand (determined by the coverage of the smaller …rm) is a relatively large share of the total demand (determined by the larger coverage), then competition is intense and margins are constrained. The incentive to spend resources to expand coverage depends on the return to investment and, therefore, on the equilibrium margin. It follows that a larger contestable demand reduces the larger …rm's incentive to expand the non-contestable demand (because it reduces margins) and, therefore, total coverage. When the two …rms merge, the merged entity raises margins on the two services o¤ered to consumers. This raises the return on investment in coverage expansion and, therefore, leads to a higher total coverage. The paper by Bourreau and Jullien (2017) is admittedly speci…c to technology adoption, but it brings two key insights. First, it shows that for some types of innovation, a merger may indeed lead to an increase in the level of investment even in the absence of spillovers and e¢ ciencies. Second, it highlights when and why this may occur.
Consider now an innovator replacing an old product with a new one. The new product is of better quality and thus generates more sales. As already discussed, an innovator introducing a new product needs to decide on how to balance its margin and sales so as to maximize pro…ts. The key element in this trade-o¤ is the own price-elasticity of demand: 18 if the postinnovation demand faced by the innovator is signi…cantly less elastic than the pre-innovation demand, then the innovator will set the price of the new product above the price of the old product. However, if the post-innovation demand is as elastic as the pre-innovation demand, the innovator will prefer to maintain the price at its pre-innovation level, and sell higher quantities. When the …rm competes in the market with sellers of substitutable products, this trade-o¤ is also a¤ected by the behavior of competitors, but a similar logic applies.
Let us now consider the case in which innovation does not a¤ect signi…cantly the innovator's margin (because innovation increases the level of demand but does not have a signi…cant e¤ect on the price-elasticity of demand). For the sake of argument, assume that innovation does not a¤ect the innovator's margin at all. In this case, innovation is solely motivated by the willingness to expand demand and the pro…t from innovation can be written as
where M 0 is the pre-innovation margin, Q 0 is the pre-innovation quantity and Q 1 (X) is the post-innovation quantity sold for an investment X in R&D. The key driver of innovation in this setting is the margin M 0 , whose level is a¤ected in particular by the intensity of competition. Suppose now that an innovative …rm merges with the seller of a competing good (for conciseness, suppose this seller cannot innovate). As a consequence of less intense competition, the margins will increase on all products and, in particular, M 0 will increase.
It follows that the innovator will have higher bene…ts from expanding demand and thus will invest more to do so. We call this the demand expansion e¤ect.
While this e¤ect is quite transparent in the above example, we argue below that it is actually present in all mergers involving product innovation. We summarize it as follows:
Higher post-merger margins raise incentives to invest in demand-enhancing innovation.
In contrast, let us now consider the case in which innovation a¤ects mostly the margin, both in the merger scenario and in the absence of a merger. Innovation is then mostly motivated by the willingness to increase the margin rather than sales. Assume that the volume of sales is not a¤ected by innovation. Then, we can write the innovation pro…t as
where M 1 (X) is the post-innovation margin. In this case, the key driver of innovation is the pre-innovation volume of sales Q 0 : This quantity depends on market structure. If the innovative …rm merges with a competitor, standard merger analysis shows that, absent e¢ -ciency gains, the new entity is expected to produce less than in the no-merger scenario. As a consequence of the reduction in the volume of sales Q 0 ; the new entity will invest less in margin-enhancing innovation. We call this the margin expansion e¤ect.
Again, this e¤ect will be present to a variable extent in all merger situations involving product innovation. We summarize it as follows:
Lower post-merger output reduces incentives to invest in margin-enhancing innovation.
The demand expansion e¤ect and the margin expansion e¤ect are essential e¤ects that need to be considered, along with the innovation diversion e¤ect, when evaluating the likely impact of a merger on the incentives to innovate. In general, the innovative …rm will increase both margins and quantity so that both e¤ects will coexist. We then expect these two e¤ects to be con ‡icting as the demand expansion e¤ect is associated with a positive impact of a merger on innovation, while the margin expansion e¤ect is associated with a negative impact on innovation. Which e¤ect dominates depends on how innovation a¤ects the level and elasticity of demand.
The scenario analyzed by Bourreau and Jullien (2017) is one where the demand expansion e¤ect dominates. In contrast, Bourreau, Lefouili and Jullien (2018) show that the analysis by Motta and Tarantino (2017) of the e¤ect of mergers on product innovation 19 and the analysis by Federico, Langus and Valletti (2017b) rely on classes of demand functions for which the main e¤ect at work is the margin expansion e¤ect. This explains why they get a negative impact of mergers on innovation.
More precisely, Bourreau, Lefouili and Jullien (2018) present a theoretical framework that allows to disentangle the various e¤ects of a merger on innovation. They focus on a symmetric duopoly model where the innovation e¤orts exerted by a …rm a¤ects its demand in a predictable way. Their analysis shows that the impact of a merger on innovation can be decomposed into four terms corresponding to the three e¤ects discussed above and an interaction term. More precisely, the margin expansion e¤ect is proportional to the reduction in demand due to price coordination within the merged entity; the demand expansion e¤ect is related to the price diversion ratio which measures what share of sales corresponds to sales diverted from the competitor when the price decreases, and is used in UPP analysis (Farrell and Shapiro, 2010) ; the innovation diversion e¤ect is related to the innovation diversion ratio -discussed by Salinger (2016) 20 -which measures what share of sales corresponds to sales diverted from the competitor when investment in innovation increases; the fourth term is an interaction term that cannot be signed a priori and that relates to the change in the relative e¤ect of innovation and price on the demand when the price increases.
The decomposition provided by Bourreau, Lefouili and Jullien (2018) allows us to identify the key e¤ects at work and to discuss the likely impact of a merger on the merged entity's investment in R&D under various model speci…cations. In particular, the authors perform this exercise for the models used in the analysis of product innovation by Motta and Tarantino (2017) and by Federico, Langus and Valletti (2017b) . 21 A …rst class of models considered by both papers is one in which all consumers attach the same value to a unit increase in quality, which implies that increasing quality has the same e¤ect on demand as decreasing prices. Bourreau, Lefouili and Jullien (2018) show that for this particular class of modelssometimes referred to as models with hedonic prices -the demand expansion e¤ect and the innovation diversion e¤ect exactly cancel each other, while the interaction term is zero. The only remaining e¤ect is the margin expansion e¤ect which is always negative. Hence, a merger always impedes innovation in this type of models.
Motta and Tarantino (2017) also consider the class of models with quality-adjusted demand.
These models assume that consumers care about the "total quality" of the good, de…ned as the product of the quantity bought and the quality of the good. 22 Further, Federico, Langus and Valletti (2017b) consider a class of models with CES demand. For these two classes of models, Bourreau, Lefouili and Jullien (2018) show that the sum of all the e¤ects is always negative.
Thus, in the classes of models discussed above, the margin expansion e¤ect, somewhat arti…cially, dominates the other e¤ects. Bourreau, Lefouili and Jullien (2018) show formally that in the framework they consider, i.e., demand-enhancing innovation in an industry which is symmetric before the merger, most demand speci…cations considered by Federico, Langus and Valletti (2017b) and Motta and Tarantino (2017) can only lead to the conclusion that a merger will impede innovation.
To illustrate the fact that other demand speci…cations may reverse the conclusion that these two papers reach regarding the impact of mergers on product innovation, Bourreau, 2 0 This paper is discussed in Section 3.2.3. 2 1 Federico et al. (2017b) model an uncertain innovation technology and assume a sequential choice of innovations and prices. While our results do not apply directly to their setting, the properties of the demand functions that we demonstrate below should help explain their conclusions.
2 2 In this case the demand for total quality depends on the price per unit of quality. Innovation increases the quality of the product, reducing the e¤ective per unit price of quality for a given price of the product. Lefouili and Jullien (2018) use the same decomposition in a model where innovation allows two …rms to di¤erentiate their products. The setting they consider is a standard extension of the Hotelling model. In that setting, innovation raises a …rm's demand and relaxes price competition because it increases product di¤erentiation. Therefore, both the innovation diversion e¤ect and the demand expansion e¤ect are positive. The sum of these two e¤ects dominates the margin expansion e¤ect, which implies that a merger raises the level of investment in R&D. 23
Technological spillovers
Technological spillovers refer to the "phenomenon that technological improvement by one company may help other companies improve their technology as well" (Salinger, 2016) . Spillovers are pervasive in the context of R&D (see e.g., Bloom et al., 2013) and are highly relevant for the analysis of incentives in merger assessment.
In this section, we …rst present spillovers that may exist regardless of whether the merger occurs or not (d 'Aspremont et Jacquemin, 1986; Lopez and Vives, 2016) , and analyze the way they a¤ect the impact of a merger on innovation. We then explain why a merger can increase spillovers between the merging …rms. Finally, we discuss how spillovers can be taken into account in merger control.
A …rst example of technological spillovers, that has received much attention in the literature, is the fact that a …rm's innovation may be imitated (to some extent) by its rivals due to weak (enforcement of) intellectual property rights. This type of spillovers is likely to be more prevalent for product innovations rather than process innovations as the latter can often be e¤ectively protected by means of a trade secret, while the former typically cannot. Since the magnitude of this type of spillovers is strongly related to the strength of intellectual property rights, they can often be assessed without a thorough understanding of the merging partner's R&D processes.
However, there are other types of technological spillovers. In particular, spillovers may happen when researchers present their work in conferences and publications. They may also result from the mobility of researchers across companies. Finally, spillovers need not be contemporaneous; they can be inter-temporal. An example is that of sequential innovations by rivals who build upon the knowledge di¤used in patents to develop new products or processes that do not infringe the …rst innovator's patent rights. 24 Note that such spillovers may exist even in the presence of relatively strong intellectual property rights.
A common feature of the spillovers discussed above is that they are positive innovation externalities and, therefore, their internalization by the merged entity has a positive e¤ect on its incentives to invest in R&D. This e¤ect should be combined with other potential positive e¤ects and weighted against other potential negative e¤ects of a merger on …rms' incentives to innovate in the assessment of individual merger cases (Katz and Shelanski, 2007) .
D 'Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) have been the …rst to investigate theoretically the e¤ect of cooperation between rivals at the R&D stage and/or the product market stage on the level of R&D investment in the presence of technological spillovers. They consider a two-stage game in which two …rms decide …rst to invest in a cost-reducing technology and then set the level of their output in the product market. In their setting, a merger has two opposite e¤ects on …rms'incentives to innovate: a positive e¤ect stemming from the internalization of spillovers by the merging …rms, and a negative e¤ect resulting from the merged entity's incentives to reduce its output which lowers the marginal bene…t from cost-reducing innovation. 25 They …nd that the overall e¤ect of a merger on innovation is negative if spillovers are low, but is positive if they are high. 26 A merger between two innovative …rms not only leads to the internalization of existing spillovers by the merged entity but is also likely to increase the level of spillovers between the merging …rms. This follows from the very nature of the knowledge used during, or produced by, the R&D process: it can be either transferred at no or little cost, or protected through intellectual property rights or secrecy. In economic terms, this type of knowledge is a public good with exclusion. By removing a motive for exclusion, a merger increases each merging …rm's use of the knowledge produced by the other merging …rm (Davidson and Ferret, 2007; Denicolò and Polo, 2018b) . 27 For instance, in the case of process innovation, a merged entity may be able to use the same cost-reducing technology developed by one of the merging partners to reduce the cost of production of the other partner. The same gains arise for product innovation when the same component (e.g., software) may be embedded in several …nal products. This implies that a merger creates economies of scale and scope in R&D as the same innovation can be exploited across multiple business units of the merged entity.
Finally, let us discuss the way spillovers can be taken into account by competition authorities in merger control. Since spillovers a¤ect …rms' incentives to innovate, they should be treated as part of the main competitive assessment conducted by competition authorities.
Salinger (2016)'s analysis of the change in incentives following a merger in the presence of spillovers shows that the logic of the upward pricing pressure (UPP) methodology can be adapted to competition in innovation, and derives a simple formula for the "net innovation pressure" (NIP) that accounts for spillovers. In his setting, consumers only care about some product characteristics that can be improved with R&D. In other words there is competition in innovation but not in prices. 28 In such a framework, a merger has only two e¤ects on the merging …rms'incentives to invest: the innovation diversion e¤ect (see Section 3.2.1) and the spillover e¤ect described above. When the diversion e¤ect is negative, the NIP methodology shows that the overall e¤ect of the merger on innovation is determined by the comparison of the diversion ratio and the spillover ratio: the merger fosters innovation if the spillover ratio exceeds the diversion ratio and reduces it otherwise. Relatedly, Bourreau, Jullien and Lefouili (2018) show that spillover e¤ects can be accounted for in their methodology by replacing the innovation diversion ratio with a "spillover-adjusted innovation diversion ratio"whose sign is given by the di¤erence between the spillover ratio and the diversion ratio. Motta and Tarantino (2017) provide a thorough theoretical analysis of the impact of horizontal mergers on …rms' incentives to invest in process innovation. More precisely, they analyze a model in which …rms producing di¤erentiated products choose the level of their investment in cost-reducing innovation (in addition to setting prices). 29 They …rst investigate the e¤ect of a merger to monopoly on …rms'incentives to invest in R&D. This is akin to examining the e¤ect of a merger on the merging …rms'incentives to innovate holding …xed the non-merging …rms'behavior. They …nd that, absent involuntary spillovers and merger-induced e¢ ciency gains, such a merger leads to a decrease in the merged entity's investment. The key intuition behind this …nding is related to the standard market power e¤ect of mergers. The merged entity internalizes pricing externalities, which leads to higher prices relative to the benchmark scenario in which …rms set their prices independently. This implies that the quantity produced by the merging partners is lower than in the benchmark case. Since the bene…t from lowering the unit cost of production is greater the larger the quantity produced, the merging …rms bene…t less from this as compared to the case where they would act independently. This implies that the merger has a negative impact on their incentives to invest in cost-reducing technologies.
Process innovation
Motta and Tarantino also consider the scenario in which only two …rms (the "insiders") merge in an industry comprised of at least three …rms. They conduct an equilibrium analysis that takes account of the non-merging …rms'(the "outsiders") response to the merger, both in terms of prices and cost-reducing investments. The outsiders'incentives to engage in costreducing R&D are also driven by the e¤ects of the merger on the quantities they produce, which is related to their prices and those of their rivals. Because the merger reduces the competitive pressure on the outsiders, it leads to an increase of their prices, albeit at a lower extent than for insiders. Since outsiders o¤er better relative prices after the merger, their demand may increase, which would a¤ect positively their incentives to invest in costreducing innovation. While this shows that a merger may have opposite e¤ects on insiders' and outsiders'incentives to innovate, Motta and Tarantino …nd that there are cases, in which the impact on total investments in R&D decreases. Perhaps more importantly, they argue that, absent spillovers and e¢ ciency gains, a merger in an industry in which …rms compete both in prices and cost-reducing investments will typically lead to lower consumer surplus.
Motta and Tarantino focus in their baseline setting on the scenario in which investment decisions are unobservable by rivals. They then extend their analysis to the case where these decisions are observable by rivals before they set prices. This alters the analysis because …rms now know that their cost-reducing investments will make them appear more aggressive (because a lower cost gives them incentives to decrease their prices), which may make the rivals also more aggressive. Because of this "strategic" e¤ect, all …rms may end up spending less on R&D as compared to the case of unobservable investments. More importantly, this new e¤ect makes the predictions of their model regarding the impact of the merger on both investments and prices generally ambiguous. To cope with this, Motta and Tarantino use two speci…c models to suggest that their results extend qualitatively to the case where investments are observable.
Finally, the authors …nd that a merger may have a positive overall impact on investments and consumer surplus if involuntary spillovers are strong enough. While this …nding is in line with our previous discussion on the importance of taking spillovers into account in merger control, Motta and Tarantino ignore this e¤ect (or considers it to be second order with respect to the margin expansion e¤ect) in their conclusion, where they state that they "have showed that, absent cost savings from the merger, both in the general model and in all the (standard) parametric models analyzed, the merging …rms will always reduce their investments." 30 Motta and Tarantino's analysis of the e¤ect of mergers on process innovation when investments are unobservable to rivals di¤ers fundamuntally from the analysis of product innovation for two reasons. First, unlike the diversion e¤ect, the margin expansion e¤ect driving their results has a clear-cut, negative sign. Second, there is no countervailing demand expansion e¤ect in the case of process innovation. Their analysis of the case in which investments are observable shows that the e¤ect of mergers is generally ambiguous, and only establishes that their main result still holds in this scenario in two speci…c models. This, combined with the fact that technological spillovers seem to be relegated by the authors to a second-order status makes us disagree with their claim that "absent e¢ ciency gains, the well-known detrimental e¤ects of the merger are con…rmed in an environment where …rms set not only prices but also investments." 31
R&D complementarities
Perhaps more than in any other activity, talent is both a key factor for R&D and a scarce resource. A merger fosters the interactions between researchers with di¤erent experiences.
By pooling talents from two research entities, it may induce creative emulation and foster new innovative ideas. Moreover, by reallocating talents towards the most promising research projects, a merged entity may raise its research productivity.
The existence of complementarities between merging …rms'R&D assets has been emphasized in particular by Davidson and Ferret (2007) and Motta and Tarantino (2017) . Comment- Pooling of R&D assets de facto reduces production costs or raises the quality of the products o¤ered to consumers. It occurs, for instance, when a process innovation by one merging partner reduces the production cost of the other partner. Moreover, it fosters the merged entity's returns to R&D spending and, therefore, the merged …rm's investment in R&D. Just as production complementarities raise the merged …rm's incentives to expand output, complementarities in R&D raise the merged …rm's incentives to expand R&D. In Davidson and Ferret's analysis of mergers with cost-reducing R&D, the …nal outcome of the merger results from the interaction of the R&D pooling e¤ect and the standard market power e¤ect of mergers. Analyzing merger pro…tability, they conclude that "for technically close brands, bilateral mergers in multidimensional competition bene…t the insiders but harm outsiders independently of the strategic variable". 32 The condition in this statement that brands should be technically close is needed to ensure that R&D complementarities in process innovation will be large. Motta and Tarantino (2017) also examine the e¤ect of R&D complementarities in the case of process innovation, by assuming that a merger generates positive cost externalities in the R&D process. They con…rm that when there are su¢ cient R&D complementarities, a merger would result in lower costs, lower prices and higher consumer surplus.
We must also emphasize that e¢ ciency gains in production matter for the impact of mergers on innovation. This is particularly clear in the case of process innovation. Consider the margin expansion e¤ect identi…ed by Motta and Tarantino (2017) . If there are signi…cant e¢ ciency gains in production then the merger will tend to decrease prices. Therefore, the merging …rms's total output may be higher than their pre-merger total output. In this case, the same margin expansion e¤ect highlighted by Motta and Tarantino will lead to an increase in the merged entity's investment in process innovation. One implication is that e¢ ciency gains that would be su¢ cient to o¤set the negative e¤ect of the merger on prices would also remove any concern regarding a potential negative e¤ect of the merger on process innovation.
A shown by Bourreau, Jullien and Lefouili (2018) , e¢ ciency gains in the production stage also matter for the impact of mergers on product innovation. The demand expansion e¤ect relies on the fact that the marginal bene…t from engaging in demand-enhancing innovation is greater the larger the …rm's price-cost margin. An increase in the margin can be generated by an increase of prices but it can also result from a decrease in (marginal) production costs due to e¢ ciency gains in production. In the presence of such gains, we expect the price-cost margin to be greater than in their absence, 33 which would magnify the demand expansion e¤ect.
Moreover, the same argument as above shows that the margin expansion e¤ect may become positive. This would mitigate concerns about the impact of a merger on R&D investment.
Conclusions and policy implications
We argue that the academic literature on mergers and innovation does not support a presumption of a negative impact of mergers on innovation. This conclusion follows from the existence of potential positive e¤ects of mergers on innovation, even in the absence of spillovers and R&D complementarities. Leaving aside spillovers in the …rst part of our analysis, we identi…ed three main e¤ects of mergers on the incentives to innovate: the innovation diversion e¤ect, the demand expansion e¤ect and the margin expansion e¤ect. While the last one provides the merged entity with lower incentives to innovate, the second one provides it with higher incentives to innovate, and the sign of the …rst one depends on the nature of innovation. We show that the combination of these e¤ects can result in either a positive or negative impact of a merger on innovation.
Our analysis strongly suggests that competition authorities should take a neutral perspective when assessing the impact of a merger on innovation, and should balance the various e¤ects at work. Competition authorities should take account of both theories of harm and bene…ts. All the e¤ects of a merger on the incentives to innovate identi…ed in this paper, including spillover e¤ects, should be part of the main competitive assessment carried out by competition authorities. Insofar as the demand expansion and margin expansion e¤ects are part of the appropriability dimension of a merger, appropriability must be a key element in merger analysis, at par with other dimensions. In particular, there should not be a hierarchical bias towards the diversion/cannibalization aspect when analyzing the e¤ects of mergers on innovation. Such bias could result from the main message of Federico, Langus and Valletti (2017a) that "the internalization of the innovation externality remains the dominant driver of the impact of the merger on innovation incentives". Introducing an unjusti…ed leaning towards the diversion e¤ect in merger policy would be detrimental to innovation both in the short run (by blocking innovation-friendly mergers) and in the long run (by reducing the pro…tability of innovative activities). Relatedly, note that the potential positive e¤ects of a merger on innovation are not of a fundamentally di¤erent nature from its potential negative e¤ects: on the one hand, both the innovation diversion e¤ect and the spillover e¤ect capture externalities exerted by an innovative …rm on its rivals and, on the other hand, the demand expansion e¤ect and the margin expansion e¤ect are the two sides of the same coin.
Finally, we view the analysis of technological spillovers as an important part of the discussion about innovation externalities in merger analysis, at par with the diversion e¤ect.
Indeed, both spillovers and sales diversion a¤ect incentives for similar reasons, although possibly in di¤erent directions. We also want to emphasize that spillovers should not be related exclusively to imitation and, therefore, to the strength of intellectual property rights. As we argued, there are direct spillovers in R&D activities as well as inter-temporal spillovers that enhance other …rms'ability to innovate in the future.
Appendix
In this Appendix, we adapt the analysis of Federico, Langus and Valletti (2017a) to a setup in which innovators'products are potentially di¤erentiated. We show that their main result, i.e., that a merger reduces the merging …rms'incentives to innovate, hinges on the following assumption: the merged entity's incremental gain from a second innovation is smaller than the pro…t of an innovator when both …rms innovate in the no-merger scenario. When this assumption does not hold, as is the case in the standard Hotelling model with quadratic transportation costs, a merger can lead to more innovation by the merging …rms and can bene…t consumers.
For the sake of simplicity, let us consider a situation involving two …rms only, denoted …rm 1 and …rm 2. This implies that the merger will be a merger to monopoly. Suppose that each …rm is a research lab searching for an innovation that will create a new market. Initially, each …rm is inactive in the product market but actively conducts research. Firm i 2 f1; 2g may succeed in innovating with a probability i that depends on the level of investment in R&D. It costs a …rm C( i ) to achieve a probability i to innovate. Success is independent between …rms, meaning that whether a …rm innovates or not is a¤ected by neither the other …rm's investment in R&D nor the other …rm's success.
When a …rm is the sole innovator on the market it obtains a value 1 from marketing the product, equal to the monopoly pro…t. When both …rms innovate, they obtain each a duopoly pro…t 2 that is less than 1 . For example, if the product is the same for both …rms and …rms compete in prices, the value of 2 is zero. If they compete "à la Cournot" or if there is some di¤erentiation between the …rms'products, then 2 will be positive.
Consider a …rm i 2 f1; 2g ; and suppose that the other …rm, denoted j; chooses an investment C ( j ) leading to a likelihood of innovation j : Then, the pro…t of …rm i is i f(1 j ) 1 + j 2 g C( i ):
When …rm i succeeds (which happens with probability i ), there is a chance 1 j that the other …rm fails to innovate, in which case …rm i is a monopoly, and a chance j that the other …rm succeeds, in which case …rm i obtains only the duopoly pro…t.
Assuming that C(:) is a convex function, the "best-reply" of …rm i is to invest at a level that results in a probability of success i which solves the following …rst-order condition:
In a symmetric equilibrium of the innovation game, both …rms choose the same probability of success, which must be the unique solution of the following equation:
(1
Let us now consider what happens if the two …rms merge. We assume that there are no complementarities in R&D, so that the merged entity can only coordinate the research programs and the prices on the product market. The merged entity chooses the likelihood of success 1 and 2 for the lab of …rm 1 and that of …rm 2, respectively. When only one lab is successful, the merged entity obtains the monopoly pro…t 1 . But when both labs are successful, the merged entity coordinates the marketing of the two innovations which allows it to obtain the total monopoly pro…t 2 , which is larger than or equal to 1 : For example, if the two innovative products are identical, the pro…t 1 and 2 will be equal. By contrast, if the products are di¤erentiated, the pro…t with two products is larger than with one product, i.e., 2 > 1 :
The merged entity's pro…t can then be written as
We assume in what follows -as Federico, Langus and Valletti (2017a) implicitly do -that the cost function C is convex enough to ensure that the pro…t function above is concave and that it is optimal for the merged entity to invest the same amount in both research labs. 34 In this case, the pro…t is maximized at 1 = 2 = m ; the solution of max 2 (1 ) 1 + 2 2
2C( ):
The likelihood of success of each research project is then the solution of the optimality condition:
The comparison of the optimality condition for the merged entity and the equilibrium condition for the duopoly leads to the following result:
Conclusion 1
The merged entity invests less in innovation than the duopoly …rms if and only if 2 1 < 2 ; i.e., if the merged entity's incremental gain from a second innovation is smaller than the pro…t of an innovator when both …rms innovate in the no-merger scenario.
A second immediate implication of the analysis is that when 2 1 = 2 = 0; the optimality conditions and, therefore, the levels of innovation in the two scenarios coincide.
The case 2 1 = 2 = 0 corresponds to the case where the sales externality is so large that the value of a second innovation is nil (e.g., Bertrand competition with homogenous products). By continuity, we get the following result: 3 4 Denicolò and Polo (2017) show that this property may not hold if C is only slightly convex. A merger raises expected consumer surplus if is not too large and is large. The graph shows that this is the case for < 0:22 and small. Therefore, when the likelihood of innovation is small and the innovation technology does not involve strong decreasing returns to scale, a merger raises consumer surplus despite the induced increase in prices.
